Mutual Deception
Updated 2026-08-22
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
The phrase describes two parties who distrust and deceive each other, corresponding in game theory to a defection equilibrium sustained by the absence of trust and repeated interaction. In environments where deception is the norm, contracts alone cannot protect a participant. The qualification is that pre-emptive deception is not universally superior, since in repeated relationships the reputational cost of cheating usually exceeds the gain.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Use Trust Assessment: establish whether the environment rewards honest dealing or deception before choosing a posture. - Use Hard Enforcement: in a zero-trust setting, require simultaneous exchange and verifiable terms.
Anchor fast decisions
When each side expects the other to cheat, withholding information becomes the safe move, which reduces the value both can create and confirms the expectation. The equilibrium is self-sustaining until something external raises the cost of deception or the value of repeated cooperation.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- zh.wikipedia.orghttps://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B7%A6%E4%BC%A0verified
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