Repeated Game
Updated 2026-08-15
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
In game theory, a repeated game consists of a stage game played over multiple rounds by the same players, who observe some history of prior moves and can condition their strategies on it. The key qualification is that the shadow of the future must matter: cooperation becomes sustainable when the discounted value of continued play exceeds the one-off gain from defection.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Use Relationship Framing: ask whether an interaction is one-shot or continuing before choosing a move. - Use Trigger Strategy Design: set a clear cooperative rule plus a credible punishment for defection.
Anchor fast decisions
When a game ends immediately, defection is cheap because no future response exists. Repeating the interaction attaches a stream of future payoffs to current conduct, so reputation and the threat of retaliation enter the payoff calculation, and cooperation can pay better than a one-time gain.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repeated_gameverified
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