Disagreement
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
The epistemology of disagreement asks how the recognition that others disagree with us should affect our beliefs and degrees of confidence, since such recognition seems at least often to give a strong reason to think one's original belief is mistaken. The entry focuses on peer disagreement, where the other party is equally informed and equally competent, and on the rival equal weight and steadfast views.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Adjust confidence: on meeting an equally matched opponent, lower your confidence according to a stated rule. - Assess the opponent: judge first whether the other is equally informed and rational, then set how much to concede. - Bound concession: separate negotiable empirical disputes from value disagreements that are hard to translate.
Anchor fast decisions
The mechanism treats another's belief as independent evidence about shared evidence: if an equally capable party reaches the opposite conclusion, the reliability of the evidence as supporting your view is weakened. The equal weight view therefore requires splitting the difference, while the steadfast view permits retaining trust in your own reasoning; justificationist and total evidence views appeal to available justification and the whole evidence.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/verified
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