Doing vs. Allowing Harm
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Is there a moral difference between causing harm and merely allowing harm to occur? If not, then permitting passive euthanasia should count against active euthanasia as well; if there is, then our failure to prevent millions of children from dying of malnutrition, dehydration, and measles should attract the same protest. The distinction is standardly paired with double effect and the trolley problem.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Draw responsibility lines: separate what one brings about from what one fails to prevent, fixing the boundary of duty. - Assess policy: test whether institutions package preventable harm as a natural outcome. - Test intuitions: use paired cases to check whether moral judgments stay consistent.
Anchor fast decisions
The intuitive mechanism is that one who causes harm makes the world worse than it would have been without her action, while one who allows harm merely fails to improve an already bad process, so duties to prevent evil and not to produce it appear asymmetric. Counterfactual analysis reduces the difference to causal structure, and critics reply that choosing a baseline is itself a normative judgment.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
account_treeGenealogyexpand_more
menu_bookReferencesexpand_more
Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/verified
PRIVATE NOTES · Only visible to you
SAVED Q&A
ENTRY Q&A · Private saving available
Ask with a clear boundary
thinkingmodels answers from published entry context only.
Your question is sent to thinkingmodels. The answer uses public entry context only.
RELATED MODELS