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MENTAL MODEL · M5838

Signaling Game

Signaling Game
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Version 1.0.0 · Updated 2026-07-28

CORE DEFINITION

A signaling game is a dynamic game consisting of a sender (S) and a receiver (R). Initially, the sender has a given type (t), which is observed only by the sender, not by others (such as the receiver). The sender then chooses a message (m) from the set M = {m1, m2, m3,..., mj}. The receiver observes the message and chooses an action (a) from the set A = {a1, a2, a3,..., ak}. Note that the receiver cannot observe anything other than the message (e.g., the sender's type t). The payoffs for both parties are determined by the combination (t, m, a).

SCAFFOLDING EFFECT

psychology

Reduce cognitive load

A signaling game is a dynamic game consisting of a sender (S) and a receiver (R).

anchor

Anchor fast decisions

A signaling game is a dynamic game of incomplete information in game theory: nature first determines the sender's type (high/low quality), the sender observes the type and sends a signal, and the receiver observes the signal (but not the type) and takes action. Equilibria fall into three categories: separating equilibrium (signals successfully distinguish types), pooling equilibrium (signals are ineffective), and semi-separating equilibrium. High types are willing to send costly signals, while low types are unwilling to imitate, thus achieving a separating equilibrium.

MINIMUM ACTION

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Source support: Explicit

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    zh.wikipedia.orghttps://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BF%A1%E5%8F%B7%E5%8D%9A%E5%BC%88ZH · Explicit
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