Grim Trigger
Updated 2026-08-05
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
A strategy studied in repeated game theory, in which a player cooperates in every round but permanently switches to defection after any observed betrayal. In an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma the threat makes defection unprofitable when players value future payoffs enough, so mutual cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium. The core claim is that irreversible punishment can sustain cooperation. The qualification is that the threat must be credible, and that a single mistake destroys cooperation permanently.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Use Red Line Setting: Name the violations that trigger permanent exclusion before any incident occurs. - Use Public Declaration: Announce the irreversible rule openly so partners can price the risk. - Use Narrow Scope: Reserve permanent punishment for the few areas where failure is truly unacceptable.
Anchor fast decisions
A partner compares the immediate gain from defecting with the value of all future cooperative payoffs. If defection ends cooperation forever, that stream is forfeited, and when players are patient enough the forfeited value exceeds the one-time gain. The threat works only because it is both severe and believed, so the strategy converts a future stream of benefits into a hostage against present temptation.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grim_triggerverified
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