Pooling Equilibrium
Updated 2026-08-03
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Pooling equilibrium is an outcome in signaling games under asymmetric information. Different types of players, the strong and the weak candidate, the good and the bad car, all choose the same signal, so an observer who sees the signal learns nothing and cannot separate the types. It arises when distinguishing would cost too much or when the signal is cheap to fake, which is exactly the situation in interviews where every candidate wears the suit and recites the standard answers. When pooling sets in, selection degenerates into luck.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Signal value test: Ask whether this signal could be sent just as cheaply by a weak type as by a strong one. - Pooling diagnosis: If everyone can mimic the signal, treat it as noise rather than as evidence. - Selection fallback: When pooling holds, choose using methods that do not depend on the pooled signal.
Anchor fast decisions
A signal only separates types when it costs a weak player more to send than a strong one. When the cost gap collapses, mimicking becomes worthwhile for everyone, so the signal stops updating the observer's beliefs. Both the strong and the weak then rationally send the same message, and the receiver's posterior belief stays identical to the prior, which is precisely the state in which no selection can be justified by the evidence presented.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pooling_equilibriumverified
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