Rational Ignorance
Version 1.0.0 · Updated 2026-07-31
CORE DEFINITION
A concept proposed by Anthony Downs, referring to the rational behavior of voters remaining politically ignorant when voting. Since the cost of acquiring political information is high while the probability of a single voter influencing the election outcome is extremely low, rational voters choose to remain ignorant of political issues.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
Reflection on democratic politics. It explains why voters may lack the motivation for political participation and acquiring political information. In policy communication, it reminds policymakers to reduce information costs, improve policy transparency, and enhance public political participation by simplifying information and utilizing media.
Anchor fast decisions
Rational ignorance refers to individuals rationally choosing not to fully understand because the cost of acquiring information is higher than the impact of their single vote or single decision. Proposed by Downs in 1957.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- zh.wikipedia.orghttps://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%84%A1%E7%9F%A5verified
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