Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Version 1.0.0 · Updated 2026-07-30
CORE DEFINITION
A theorem proved by Kenneth Arrow, stating that under certain reasonable conditions (non-dictatorship, independence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto efficiency, etc.), it is impossible to have a perfect voting mechanism that aggregates individual preferences into a social preference, revealing the inherent difficulties of collective decision-making.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
Reflection on democratic decision-making. It reveals the fundamental constraints in the design of democratic institutions. In policy-making, it reminds policymakers that any collective decision-making mechanism has limitations, requiring trade-offs among different objectives, and supports institutional innovation to mitigate voting paradoxes.
Anchor fast decisions
Arrow proved that under several reasonable conditions (non-dictatorship, Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, etc.), there is no voting rule that can aggregate individual preferences into a consistent social preference.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/3Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theoremverified
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