Causation in the Law
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
This entry addresses three basic questions about causation in legal contexts: by what standard the law judges that one act or event caused another, usually harmful, event; whether and how legal causation differs from causation in science and everyday life; and what reasons justify such differences given the law's purpose of attributing responsibility. Factual cause and proximate cause form the two main layers of analysis.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Layer the attribution: ask first about but-for factual cause, then about proximate cause and foreseeability. - Spot policy choices: see the fairness and policy judgments hidden inside limiting doctrines of causation. - Separate causal kinds: distinguish legal causation from scientific and everyday notions of cause.
Anchor fast decisions
Law develops a causal concept unlike science's because it serves responsibility: fixing who must answer for harm and pay for it. Factual cause asks only whether the harm would have occurred without the defendant's act. Liability further requires that the harm be a foreseeable, non-coincidental consequence within the risk the act created, which is why proximate cause, foreseeability, and scope of risk enter as policy and fairness limits.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/verified
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