Trust Game
Updated 2026-08-05
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Introduced by Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe in 1995, the game gives an investor an endowment and lets them choose how much to transfer to a trustee. The experimenter multiplies the transfer, commonly by three, and the trustee then decides how much to send back. Standard self-interest predicts no transfer and no return, yet substantial trust and reciprocity appear consistently across populations. The qualification is that behavior varies with anonymity, repetition, culture, and the presence of punishment or reputation.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Use Reciprocity Test: Start with a small transfer to learn whether a counterpart returns value before scaling up. - Use Incentive Design: Build visible returns for trustworthy behavior rather than relying on goodwill alone. - Use Reputation Leverage: Use repeated interaction and known track records to make betrayal costly.
Anchor fast decisions
The game creates a genuine social dilemma: the investor gains most by trusting only if the trustee reciprocates, and the trustee gains most by keeping everything. Because the transfer multiplies, joint welfare is maximized by trust and return, so players who value mutual gain have a reason to cooperate. Expectations of reciprocity, supported by reputation and repeated play, shift the equilibrium away from pure defection toward conditional cooperation.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictator_gameverified
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