Multiple Realizability
Updated 2026-08-02
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Introduced by Hilary Putnam in the 1960s as an argument for functionalism. The same mental state, such as pain, can be realized by human neurons, an octopus nervous system, silicon hardware, or some alien substrate. Because the mental property is shared across different physical implementations, it cannot be identified with any one of them. This supports functionalism in philosophy of mind and opens the possibility of minds on non-biological substrates.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Separate the layers: distinguish the function a system performs from the material that performs it - Compare implementations: ask whether two systems with different substrates achieve the same functional role - Avoid reduction: stop treating one physical realization as the definition of the capacity
Anchor fast decisions
A functional property is specified by the relations among inputs, outputs, and internal states rather than by the material involved. Any substrate that supports those relations implements the function, so the property is realized at a level of description above the physical. This is why identifying a mental state with one particular neural pattern rules out other systems that behave identically.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_realizabilityverified
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