Moral Luck Paradox
Updated 2026-08-08
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Framed by philosophers Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in a collection on moral luck. Moral responsibility presupposes that agents control what they are judged for, yet outcomes and circumstances are substantially determined by factors outside their control. Because judgments in practice track outcomes as well as intentions, the same degree of care can yield praise or blame depending on luck, which creates a tension at the center of normative ethics.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Split the assessment: judge the decision by the information available and the outcome separately - Design rules: base sanctions on due care rather than on harm alone, so luck does not set the penalty - Read reactions: notice when your blame tracks damage rather than negligence
Anchor fast decisions
Attributions of responsibility are formed from two inputs: what the agent intended and what actually happened. Outcomes are vivid and easy to observe, while intentions must be inferred, so judgments weight outcomes more heavily than the control criterion allows. The result is that identical care produces different verdicts depending on luck.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
account_treeGenealogyexpand_more
menu_bookReferencesexpand_more
Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_luckverified
PRIVATE NOTES · Only visible to you
SAVED Q&A
ENTRY Q&A · Private saving available
Ask with a clear boundary
thinkingmodels answers from published entry context only.
Your question is sent to thinkingmodels. The answer uses public entry context only.
RELATED MODELS