Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment
Updated 2026-08-08
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Proposed by Joshua Greene and colleagues, drawing on dual process accounts of cognition. Moral judgment involves two systems: fast, automatic intuitions driven by emotion, and slower, controlled reasoning. Personal dilemmas involving direct harm strongly activate emotional responses and produce deontological judgments, while impersonal dilemmas engage deliberative processing and favor utilitarian answers. The theory explains why the same person answers inconsistently across dilemma types.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Notice the split: identify whether your judgment arrived instantly or after deliberation - Slow down high-stakes calls: introduce reasoning steps where intuition is likely to dominate - Test consistency: compare your answers across personal and impersonal versions of the same dilemma
Anchor fast decisions
Emotional reactions to direct personal harm are fast and automatic, and they generate a strong prohibition before deliberation begins. Deliberative processing is slower and can weigh outcomes, but it operates after the intuition has already fired, so it often rationalizes rather than overrides. Which system dominates depends on how vividly the dilemma engages the emotional response.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory_(moral_psychologyverified
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