Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
The dispute between internalism and externalism asks whether there is a necessary connection between reasons and motivation: internalism holds that if a reason is genuinely your reason, it must in some way motivate you, while externalism denies this. The dispute can be framed about reasons for action or about theoretical reason, and it sets the agenda for how we explain moral action.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Motivation diagnosis: judge whether someone who is unmoved lacks motivation or whether the reason itself does not hold. - Argument testing: check whether the claim that you have a reason presupposes a psychological connection. - Persuasion strategy: decide whether to first awaken desire or to present objective reasons directly.
Anchor fast decisions
The pivot of the dispute is this: if a reason is entirely external to the agent, how can it be said to belong to this person? Internalism explains the normative force of reasons by way of a motivational connection, but must then account for reasons we plainly have yet feel no motivation toward; externalism preserves the independence of reasons but must explain how they connect to action.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/verified
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