Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Rivals to Expected Utility
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
Expected utility theory, the mainstream theory of instrumental rationality, holds that agents ought to maximize expected utility. But its claim to characterize all rational preferences faces four challenges: infinite or unbounded value, incommensurability of goods, imprecise probabilities, and risk aversion, and these have spawned several alternative theories. Each challenge pinpoints an assumption the classical theory cannot accommodate.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Model diagnosis: when facing infinite value, incommensurability, or vague probabilities, judge whether expected utility theory has broken down. - Alternative selection: switch to risk-sensitive or multi-scale models according to the type of failure, rather than forcing a weighted sum.
Anchor fast decisions
Expected utility theory depends on strong assumptions: consequences are measurable on a single real-valued scale, probabilities can be precisely assigned, and the agent is risk neutral. If any is violated, maximizing expected utility no longer has an obvious rational basis, and alternative theories try to recover a characterization of rationality by relaxing the representation or the decision rule.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-normative-nonutility/verified
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