The Moral/Conventional Distinction
Updated 2026-09-10
INTRODUCTION
English translation pending.
CORE DEFINITION
This entry examines the claim that there is a psychologically real and philosophically important distinction between moral judgments and conventional judgments. Contemporary interest traces to the work of psychologist Elliot Turiel. The claim is that the two kinds of judgment separate systematically on several criteria, and that this separation is what makes the distinction more than a label.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
- Classify the transgression: sort a rule by whether it is authority-dependent and whether it involves harm or rights. - Characterize the dispute: decide whether a disagreement is a clash of principles or a difference of convention. - Adjust the rule: identify which norms can be cancelled by changing the setting.
Anchor fast decisions
If the two judgment types are psychologically distinct, they should separate systematically on several criteria: moral transgressions are seen as universally valid and not dependent on authority, and wrong because they cause harm or unfairness; conventional transgressions are seen as established by rule or authority and revocable when the setting changes. Children's differing responses to these criteria serve as the evidence.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- plato.stanford.eduhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-conventional/verified
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