Hold-up Problem
Version 1.0.0 · Updated 2026-07-30
CORE DEFINITION
When one party makes a specific investment for a transaction (e.g., buying specialized machinery to manufacture for Apple), the other party (Apple) has an incentive to exploit this by demanding renegotiation of the price, because the investor cannot easily repurpose the machinery.
SCAFFOLDING EFFECT
Reduce cognitive load
Guard against being locked in. In cooperation, if you invest in resources that only the other party can use (specific assets), you lose bargaining power. This must be addressed through long-term contracts, cross-shareholding, or vertical integration.
Anchor fast decisions
After asset-specific investment, the trading partner may opportunistically demand a larger share of the quasi-rents, leading to underinvestment ex ante. It is a core challenge in vertical integration and contract design.
MINIMUM ACTION
In progress 0/1Practice this model in one real situation:
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Source support: Explicit
- en.wikipedia.orghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hold-up_problemverified
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